Obama Regime Spends $53M On Voter ID Cards In Kenya While Calling Voter ID Laws In U.S. Racist

White House Touts US-Funded Voter ID Program In Kenya Despite Calling Voter ID Laws In America Discriminatory – Weasel Zippers

Funny how that works.

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Via Weekly Standard:

As President Obama and his family continue their tour of Africa, the White House put out a Fact Sheet entitled “U.S. Support for Strengthening Democratic Institutions, Rule of Law, and Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa.” One of the first items highlighted by the White House is a $53 million program in Kenya that helps young people ”obtain National identification cards, a prerequisite to voter registration.”

Civil society and independent media play a critical role in any vibrant democracy. Across sub-Saharan Africa, the United States supports efforts to ensure civil society organizations and independent media can organize, advocate, and raise awareness with governments and the private sector to improve political processes, transparency, and government performance. Examples include:

• In Kenya, the $53 million Yes Youth Can program empowers nearly one million Kenyan youth to use their voices for advocacy in national and local policy-making, while also creating economic opportunities. In advance of Kenya’s March 2013 general elections, Yes Youth Can’s “My ID My Life” campaign helped 500,000 youth obtain National identification cards, a prerequisite to voter registration, and carried out a successful nationwide campaign with Kenyan civic organizations to elicit peace pledges from all presidential aspirants. [emphasis added]

Keep reading…

Click HERE For Rest Of Story

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*VIDEO* Congressman Roskam Loses It On Lying Sack O’ Crap IRS Commissioner


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*VIDEO* John Linder: The Case For The Fair Tax


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………..Click on the image above to purchase Mr. Linder’s book.

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Click HERE to visit the Fair Tax website.

The Fair Tax Act Of 2007 (HR 25/S 1025) – Plain English Summary

The Fair Tax Act Of 2007 (HR 25/S 1025) – Entire Bill

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*AUDIO* Mark Levin Verbally Bitchslaps Senate RINOs Over Amnesty Bill


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Petition Website Set Up To Recall Marco Rubio

Enough Is Enough… Petition Website Set Up To Recall Marco Rubio – Gateway Pundit

A petition webpage was set up to recall Marco Rubio today.

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Via Free Republic:

Target: Marco Rubio
Sponsored by: William May
Recall Senator Marco Rubio

Marco Rubio in his own words previously while serving in the state legislature; during his campaign for office and his recent rhetoric on TV, Talk Radio, commercials, emails and surveys sent to his constituents stating that the border must be secured first then path to citizenship. The senator now has changed his promise to suit what he decides is in his best interest and not honor his own commitment to his campaign, voters and supporters thereby disenfranchising them.

Had the Senator expressed his true beliefs on illegal immigration over his term in the state legislature and during his campaign it is doubtful that he would have acquired the nomination to run as the republican candidate for Senator from Florida and most assuredly the election results would be in doubt for his favor.

Due to his own words and actions Senator Marco Rubio has nullified the votes cast for him by disenfranchising voters with glib and false rhetoric corrupting the good faith and will of the voters whose recourse now is to recall the Senator and force him to reveal the factual representation of himself and allow the voters to now judge him based on his true beliefs, values not on false and misleading campaign rhetroic statements.

Rubio, the most visible advocate of the Senate’s comprehensive immigration reform plan, is now viewed favorably by only 58% of Republican voters nationwide – down 15 points since February.

Click HERE For Rest Of Story

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Bill Clinton Praises Supreme Court For Basically Calling Him A Bigot And A Homophobe

Clintons Praise Supreme Court Reversal Of Bill Clinton’s Gay Marriage Ban – Daily Caller

Bill and Hillary Clinton praised the Supreme Court’s reversal of a key provision in the Defense of Marriage Act Wednesday, calling the 1996 law “discrimination.”

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“By overturning the Defense of Marriage Act, the Court recognized that discrimination towards any group holds us all back in our efforts to form a more perfect union,” the Clintons said in a statement posted on the Clinton Foundation website. “We are also encouraged that marriage equality may soon return to California.”

The former president and his wife, the former secretary of state, concluded, “We applaud the hard work of the advocates who have fought so relentlessly for this day, and congratulate Edie Windsor on her historic victory.”

Left unmentioned was the fact that Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act into law while president. The 1996 Clinton-Gore ticket ran ads on Christian radio stations taking credit for the legislation, which prevented federal recognition of same-sex marriage.

The Defense of Marriage Act also allowed states to withhold recognition of gay marriages that were legal in other states. Senate Democrats voted 32 to 14 in favor. House Democrats supported it by a margin of a margin of 188 to 65.

Liberal stalwarts Joe Biden, Paul Wellstone and Barbara Milkulski were among the Democratic “yes” votes.

Democratic strategist Robert Shrum has said that Clinton urged John Kerry to support state-level gay marriage bans during the 2004 presidential campaign. Clinton has denied the charge.

Hillary Clinton also supported DOMA as a Democratic senator from New York. Even as she argued against a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, she described marriage as “not just a bond, but a sacred bond between a man and a woman.” She cited her own troubled marriage with Bill as a reason for that belief.

Clinton then invoked “the fundamental bedrock principle that [marriage] exists between a man and a woman going back into the mists of history as one of the founding foundational institutions of history and humanity and civilization, and that its primary, principle role during those millennia has been the raising and socializing of children for the society into which they are to become adults.”

Early in her presidential campaign, Clinton insisted to the YearlyKos convention that “DOMA served a very useful purpose.”

Both Clintons now favor gay marriage. Hillary Clinton is considered the frontrunner for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination.

Click HERE For Rest Of Story

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U.S. Supreme Court DOMA Ruling: Complete Dissenting Opinion Of Justice Antonin Scalia

Justice Antonin Scalia: Dissenting Opinion – Cornell Law

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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. EDITH SCHLAIN WINDSOR, in her capacity as executor of the ESTATE OF THEA CLARA SPYER, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
[June 26, 2013]

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, and with whom The Chief Justice joins as to Part I, dissenting.

This case is about power in several respects. It is about the power of our people to govern themselves, and the power of this Court to pronounce the law. Today’s opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable consequence of diminishing the former. We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation. The Court’s errors on both points spring forth from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the role of this institution in America.

I

A

The Court is eager—hungry—to tell everyone its view of the legal question at the heart of this case. Standing in the way is an obstacle, a technicality of little interest to anyone but the people of We the People, who created it as a barrier against judges’ intrusion into their lives. They gave judges, in Article III, only the “judicial Power,” a power to decide not abstract questions but real, concrete “Cases” and “Controversies.” Yet the plaintiff and the Government agree entirely on what should happen in this lawsuit. They agree that the court below got it right; and they agreed in the court below that the court below that one got it right as well. What, then, are we doing here?

The answer lies at the heart of the jurisdictional portion of today’s opinion, where a single sentence lays bare the majority’s vision of our role. The Court says that we have the power to decide this case because if we did not, then our “primary role in determining the constitutionality of a law” (at least one that “has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff”) would “become only secondary to the President’s.” Ante, at 12. But wait, the reader wonders—Windsor won below, and so cured her injury, and the President was glad to see it. True, says the majority, but judicial review must march on regardless, lest we “undermine the clear dictate of the separation-of-powers principle that when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

That is jaw-dropping. It is an assertion of judicial supremacy over the people’s Representatives in Congress and the Executive. It envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional questions, always and every- where “primary” in its role.

This image of the Court would have been unrecognizable to those who wrote and ratified our national charter. They knew well the dangers of “primary” power, and so created branches of government that would be “perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission,” none of which branches could “pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers.” The Federalist, No. 49, p. 314 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The people did this to protect themselves. They did it to guard their right to self-rule against the black-robed supremacy that today’s majority finds so attractive. So it was that Madison could confidently state, with no fear of contradiction, that there was nothing of “greater intrinsic value” or “stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty” than a government of separate and coordinate powers. Id., No. 47, at 301.

For this reason we are quite forbidden to say what the law is whenever (as today’s opinion asserts) “ ‘an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution.’ ” Ante, at 12. We can do so only when that allegation will determine the outcome of a lawsuit, and is contradicted by the other party. The “judicial Power” is not, as the majority believes, the power “ ‘to say what the law is,’ ” ibid., giving the Supreme Court the “primary role in determining the constitutionality of laws.” The majority must have in mind one of the foreign constitutions that pronounces such primacy for its constitutional court and allows that primacy to be exercised in contexts other than a lawsuit. See, e.g., Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 93. The judicial power as Americans have understood it (and their English ancestors before them) is the power to adjudicate, with conclusive effect, disputed government claims (civil or criminal) against private persons, and disputed claims by private persons against the government or other private persons. Sometimes (though not always) the parties before the court disagree not with regard to the facts of their case (or not only with regard to the facts) but with regard to the applicable law—in which event (and only in which event) it becomes the “ ‘province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” Ante, at 12.

In other words, declaring the compatibility of state or federal laws with the Constitution is not only not the “primary role” of this Court, it is not a separate, free-standing role at all. We perform that role incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is necessary to resolve the dispute before us. Then, and only then, does it become “ ‘the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” That is why, in 1793, we politely declined the Washington Administration’s request to “say what the law is” on a particular treaty matter that was not the subject of a concrete legal controversy. 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486–489 (H. Johnston ed. 1893). And that is why, as our opinions have said, some questions of law will never be presented to this Court, because there will never be anyone with standing to bring a lawsuit. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227 (1974) ; United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 179 (1974) . As Justice Brandeis put it, we cannot “pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding”; absent a “ ‘real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals,’ ” we have neither any work to do nor any power to do it. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892) ). Our authority begins and ends with the need to adjudge the rights of an injured party who stands before us seeking redress. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) .

That is completely absent here. Windsor’s injury was cured by the judgment in her favor. And while, in ordinary circumstances, the United States is injured by a directive to pay a tax refund, this suit is far from ordinary. Whatever injury the United States has suffered will surely not be redressed by the action that it, as a litigant, asks us to take. The final sentence of the Solicitor General’s brief on the merits reads: “For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.” Brief for United States (merits) 54 (emphasis added). That will not cure the Government’s injury, but carve it into stone. One could spend many fruitless afternoons ransacking our library for any other petitioner’s brief seeking an affirmance of the judgment against it. 1 What the petitioner United States asks us to do in the case before us is exactly what the respondent Windsor asks us to do: not to provide relief from the judgment below but to say that that judgment was correct. And the same was true in the Court of Appeals: Neither party sought to undo the judgment for Windsor, and so that court should have dismissed the appeal (just as we should dismiss) for lack of jurisdiction. Since both parties agreed with the judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the suit should have ended there. The further proceedings have been a contrivance, having no object in mind except to elevate a District Court judgment that has no precedential effect in other courts, to one that has precedential effect throughout the Second Circuit, and then (in this Court) precedential effect throughout the United States.

We have never before agreed to speak—to “say what the law is”—where there is no controversy before us. In the more than two centuries that this Court has existed as an institution, we have never suggested that we have the power to decide a question when every party agrees with both its nominal opponent and the court below on that question’s answer. The United States reluctantly conceded that at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20.

The closest we have ever come to what the Court blesses today was our opinion in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983) . But in that case, two parties to the litigation disagreed with the position of the United States and with the court below: the House and Senate, which had intervened in the case. Because Chadha concerned the validity of a mode of congressional action—the one-house legislative veto—the House and Senate were threatened with destruction of what they claimed to be one of their institutional powers. The Executive choosing not to defend that power, 2 we permitted the House and Senate to intervene. Nothing like that is present here.

To be sure, the Court in Chadha said that statutory aggrieved-party status was “not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional.” Id., at 930–931. But in a footnote to that statement, the Court acknowledged Article III’s separate requirement of a “justiciable case or controversy,” and stated that this requirement was satisfied “because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties.” Id., at 931, n. 6. Later in its opinion, the Chadha Court remarked that the United States’ announced intention to enforce the statute also sufficed to permit judicial review, even absent congressional participation. Id., at 939. That remark is true, as a description of the judicial review conducted in the Court of Appeals, where the Houses of Congress had not intervened. (The case originated in the Court of Appeals, since it sought review of agency action under 8 U. S. C. §1105a(a) (1976 ed.).) There, absent a judgment setting aside the INS order, Chadha faced deportation. This passage of our opinion seems to be addressing that initial standing in the Court of Appeals, as indicated by its quotation from the lower court’s opinion, 462 U. S., at 939–940. But if it was addressing standing to pursue the appeal, the remark was both the purest dictum (as congressional intervention at that point made the required adverseness “beyond doubt,” id., at 939), and quite incorrect. When a private party has a judicial decree safely in hand to prevent his injury, additional judicial action requires that a party injured by the decree seek to undo it. In Chadha, the intervening House and Senate fulfilled that requirement. Here no one does.

The majority’s discussion of the requirements of Article III bears no resemblance to our jurisprudence. It accuses the amicus (appointed to argue against our jurisdiction) of “elid[ing] the distinction between . . . the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the prudential limits on its exercise.” Ante, at 6. It then proceeds to call the requirement of adverseness a “prudential” aspect of standing. Of standing. That is incomprehensible. A plaintiff (or appellant) can have all the standing in the world—satisfying all three standing requirements of Lujan that the majority so carefully quotes, ante, at 7—and yet no Article III controversy may be before the court. Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain but an opposing party who denies the validity of the complaint. It is not the amicus that has done the eliding of distinctions, but the majority, calling the quite separate Article III requirement of adverseness between the parties an element (which it then pronounces a “prudential” element) of standing. The question here is not whether, as the majority puts it, “the United States retains a stake sufficient to support Article III jurisdiction,” ibid. the question is whether there is any controversy (which requires contradiction) between the United States and Ms. Windsor. There is not.

I find it wryly amusing that the majority seeks to dismiss the requirement of party-adverseness as nothing more than a “prudential” aspect of the sole Article III requirement of standing. (Relegating a jurisdictional requirement to “prudential” status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they believe it “prudent”—which is to say, a good idea.) Half a century ago, a Court similarly bent upon announcing its view regarding the constitutionality of a federal statute achieved that goal by effecting a remarkably similar but completely opposite distortion of the principles limiting our jurisdiction. The Court’s notorious opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83–101 (1968), held that standing was merely an element (which it pronounced to be a “prudential” element) of the sole Article III requirement of adverseness. We have been living with the chaos created by that power-grabbing decision ever since, see Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U. S. 587 (2007) , as we will have to live with the chaos created by this one.

The authorities the majority cites fall miles short of supporting the counterintuitive notion that an Article III “controversy” can exist without disagreement between the parties. In Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326 (1980) , the District Court had entered judgment in the individual plaintiff’s favor based on the defendant bank’s offer to pay the full amount claimed. The plaintiff, however, sought to appeal the District Court’s denial of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. There was a continuing dispute between the parties concerning the issue raised on appeal. The same is true of the other case cited by the majority, Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___ (2011). There the District Court found that the defendant state officers had violated the Fourth Amendment, but rendered judgment in their favor because they were entitled to official immunity, application of the Fourth Amendment to their conduct not having been clear at the time of violation. The officers sought to appeal the holding of Fourth Amendment violation, which would circumscribe their future conduct; the plaintiff continued to insist that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. The “prudential” discretion to which both those cases refer was the discretion to deny an appeal even when a live controversy exists—not the discretion to grant one when it does not. The majority can cite no case in which this Court entertained an appeal in which both parties urged us to affirm the judgment below. And that is because the existence of a controversy is not a “prudential” requirement that we have invented, but an essential element of an Article III case or controversy. The majority’s notion that a case between friendly parties can be entertained so long as “adversarial presentation of the issues is assured by the participation of amici curiae prepared to defend with vigor” the other side of the issue, ante, at 10, effects a breathtaking revolution in our Article III jurisprudence.

It may be argued that if what we say is true some Presidential determinations that statutes are unconstitutional will not be subject to our review. That is as it should be, when both the President and the plaintiff agree that the statute is unconstitutional. Where the Executive is enforcing an unconstitutional law, suit will of course lie; but if, in that suit, the Executive admits the unconstitutionality of the law, the litigation should end in an order or a consent decree enjoining enforcement. This suit saw the light of day only because the President enforced the Act (and thus gave Windsor standing to sue) even though he believed it unconstitutional. He could have equally chosen (more appropriately, some would say) neither to enforce nor to defend the statute he believed to be unconstitutional, see Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (Nov. 2, 1994)—in which event Windsor would not have been injured, the District Court could not have refereed this friendly scrimmage, and the Executive’s determination of unconstitutionality would have escaped this Court’s desire to blurt out its view of the law. The matter would have been left, as so many matters ought to be left, to a tug of war between the President and the Congress, which has innumerable means (up to and including impeachment) of compelling the President to enforce the laws it has written. Or the President could have evaded presentation of the constitutional issue to this Court simply by declining to appeal the District Court and Court of Appeals dispositions he agreed with. Be sure of this much: If a President wants to insulate his judgment of unconstitutionality from our review, he can. What the views urged in this dissent produce is not insulation from judicial review but insulation from Executive contrivance.

The majority brandishes the famous sentence from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Ante, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). But that sentence neither says nor implies that it is always the province and duty of the Court to say what the law is—much less that its responsibility in that regard is a “primary” one. The very next sentence of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion makes the crucial qualification that today’s majority ignores: “Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” 1 Cranch, at 177 (emphasis added). Only when a “particular case” is before us—that is, a controversy that it is our business to resolve under Article III—do we have the province and duty to pronounce the law. For the views of our early Court more precisely addressing the question before us here, the ma- jority ought instead to have consulted the opinion of Chief Justice Taney in Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251 (1850):

“The objection in the case before us is . . . that the plaintiff and defendant have the same interest, and that interest adverse and in conflict with the interest of third persons, whose rights would be seriously affected if the question of law was decided in the manner that both of the parties to this suit desire it to be.

“A judgment entered under such circumstances, and for such purposes, is a mere form. The whole proceeding was in contempt of the court, and highly reprehensible . . . . A judgment in form, thus procured, in the eye of the law is no judgment of the court. It is a nullity, and no writ of error will lie upon it. This writ is, therefore, dismissed.” Id., at 255–256.

There is, in the words of Marbury, no “necessity [to] expound and interpret” the law in this case; just a desire to place this Court at the center of the Nation’s life. 1 Cranch, at 177.

B

A few words in response to the theory of jurisdiction set forth in Justice Alito’s dissent: Though less far reaching in its consequences than the majority’s conversion of constitutionally required adverseness into a discretionary element of standing, the theory of that dissent similarly elevates the Court to the “primary” determiner of constitutional questions involving the separation of powers, and, to boot, increases the power of the most dangerous branch: the “legislative department,” which by its nature “draw[s] all power into its impetuous vortex.” The Federalist, No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison). Heretofore in our national history, the President’s failure to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U. S. Const., Art. II, §3, could only be brought before a judicial tribunal by someone whose concrete interests were harmed by that alleged failure. Justice Alito would create a system in which Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws. 3 This would lay to rest Tocqueville’s praise of our judicial system as one which “intimately bind[s] the case made for the law with the case made for one man,” one in which legislation is “no longer exposed to the daily aggression of the parties,” and in which “[t]he political question that [the judge] must resolve is linked to the interest” of private litigants. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 97 (H. Mansfield D. Winthrop eds. 2000). That would be replaced by a system in which Congress and the Executive can pop immediately into court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President refuses to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and whenever he implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress’s liking.

Justice Alito’s notion of standing will likewise enormously shrink the area to which “judicial censure, exercised by the courts on legislation, cannot extend,” ibid. For example, a bare majority of both Houses could bring into court the assertion that the Executive’s implementation of welfare programs is too generous—a failure that no other litigant would have standing to complain about. Moreover, as we indicated in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 828 (1997) , if Congress can sue the Executive for the erroneous application of the law that “injures” its power to legislate, surely the Executive can sue Congress for its erroneous adoption of an unconstitutional law that “injures” the Executive’s power to administer—or perhaps for its protracted failure to act on one of his nominations. The opportunities for dragging the courts into disputes hitherto left for political resolution are endless.

Justice Alito’s dissent is correct that Raines did not formally decide this issue, but its reasoning does. The opinion spends three pages discussing famous, decades-long disputes between the President and Congress—regarding congressional power to forbid the Presidential removal of executive officers, regarding the legislative veto, regarding congressional appointment of executive officers, and regarding the pocket veto—that would surely have been promptly resolved by a Congress-vs.-the-President lawsuit if the impairment of a branch’s powers alone conferred standing to commence litigation. But it does not, and never has; the “enormous power that the judiciary would acquire” from the ability to adjudicate such suits “would have made a mockery of [Hamilton’s] quotation of Montesquieu to the effect that ‘of the three powers above mentioned . . . the JUDICIARY is next to nothing.’ ” Barnes v. Kline, 759 F. 2d 21, 58 (CADC 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (quoting The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton)).

To be sure, if Congress cannot invoke our authority in the way that Justice Alito proposes, then its only recourse is to confront the President directly. Unimaginable evil this is not. Our system is designed for confrontation. That is what “[a]mbition . . . counteract[ing] ambition,” The Federalist, No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison), is all about. If majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about the matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel executive action without a lawsuit—from refusing to confirm Presidential appointees to the elimination of funding. (Nothing says “enforce the Act” quite like “. . . or you will have money for little else.”) But the condition is crucial; Congress must care enough to act against the President itself, not merely enough to instruct its lawyers to ask us to do so. Placing the Constitution’s entirely anticipated political arm wrestling into permanent judicial receivership does not do the system a favor. And by the way, if the President loses the lawsuit but does not faithfully implement the Court’s decree, just as he did not faithfully implement Congress’s statute, what then? Only Congress can bring him to heel by . . . what do you think? Yes: a direct confrontation with the President.

II

For the reasons above, I think that this Court has, and the Court of Appeals had, no power to decide this suit. We should vacate the decision below and remand to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with instructions to dismiss the appeal. Given that the majority has volunteered its view of the merits, however, I proceed to discuss that as well.

A

There are many remarkable things about the majority’s merits holding. The first is how rootless and shifting its justifications are. For example, the opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I am sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion. But we are eventually told that “it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution,” and that “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism” because “the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.” Ante, at 18. But no one questions the power of the States to define marriage (with the concomitant conferral of dignity and status), so what is the point of devoting seven pages to describing how long and well established that power is? Even after the opinion has formally disclaimed reliance upon principles of federalism, mentions of “the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” continue. See, e.g., ante, at 20. What to make of this? The opinion never explains. My guess is that the majority, while reluctant to suggest that defining the meaning of “marriage” in federal statutes is unsupported by any of the Federal Government’s enumerated powers, 4 nonetheless needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today’s prohibition of laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term). But I am only guessing.

Equally perplexing are the opinion’s references to “the Constitution’s guarantee of equality.” Ibid. Near the end of the opinion, we are told that although the “equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes [the] Fifth Amendment [due process] right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved”—what can that mean?—“the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does.” Ante, at 25. The only possible interpretation of this statement is that the Equal Protection Clause, even the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated in the Due Process Clause, is not the basis for today’s holding. But the portion of the majority opinion that explains why DOMA is unconstitutional (Part IV) begins by citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954) , Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973) , and Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) —all of which are equal-protection cases. 5 And those three cases are the only authorities that the Court cites in Part IV about the Constitution’s meaning, except for its citation of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (not an equal-protection case) to support its passing assertion that the Constitution protects the “moral and sexual choices” of same-sex couples, ante, at 23.

Moreover, if this is meant to be an equal-protection opinion, it is a confusing one. The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality. That is the issue that divided the parties and the court below, compare Brief for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of U. S. House of Representatives (merits) 24–28 (no), with Brief for Respondent Windsor (merits) 17–31 and Brief for United States (merits) 18–36 (yes); and compare 699 F. 3d 169, 180–185 (CA2 2012) (yes), with id., at 208–211 (Straub, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (no). In accord with my previously expressed skepticism about the Court’s “tiers of scrutiny” approach, I would review this classification only for its rationality. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515–570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees with that; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases like Moreno. But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential framework. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993) (a classification “ ‘must be upheld . . . if there is any reason- ably conceivable state of facts’ ” that could justify it).

The majority opinion need not get into the strict-vs.-rational-basis scrutiny question, and need not justify its holding under either, because it says that DOMA is unconstitutional as “a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,” ante, at 25; that it violates “basic due process” principles, ante, at 20; and that it inflicts an “injury and indignity” of a kind that denies “an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment,” ante, at 19. The majority never utters the dread words “substantive due process,” perhaps sensing the disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but that is what those statements mean. Yet the opinion does not argue that same-sex marriage is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702–721 (1997), a claim that would of course be quite absurd. So would the further suggestion (also necessary, under our substantive-due-process precedents) that a world in which DOMA exists is one bereft of “ ‘ordered liberty.’ ” Id., at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) ).

Some might conclude that this loaf could have used a while longer in the oven. But that would be wrong; it is already overcooked. The most expert care in preparation cannot redeem a bad recipe. The sum of all the Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a role) because it is motivated by a “ ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ ” couples in same-sex marriages. Ante, at 20. It is this proposition with which I will therefore engage.

B

As I have observed before, the Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral and sexual norms. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). I will not swell the U. S. Reports with restatements of that point. It is enough to say that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.

However, even setting aside traditional moral disapproval of same-sex marriage (or indeed same-sex sex), there are many perfectly valid—indeed, downright boring—justifying rationales for this legislation. Their existence ought to be the end of this case. For they give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only those with hateful hearts could have voted “aye” on this Act. And more importantly, they serve to make the contents of the legislators’ hearts quite irrelevant: “It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968) . Or at least it was a familiar principle. By holding to the contrary, the majority has declared open season on any law that (in the opinion of the law’s opponents and any panel of like-minded federal judges) can be characterized as mean-spirited.

The majority concludes that the only motive for this Act was the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” Ante, at 20. Bear in mind that the object of this condemnation is not the legislature of some once-Confederate Southern state (familiar objects of the Court’s scorn, see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987) ), but our respected coordinate branches, the Congress and Presidency of the United States. Laying such a charge against them should require the most extraordinary evidence, and I would have thought that every attempt would be made to indulge a more anodyne explanation for the statute. The majority does the opposite—affirmatively concealing from the reader the arguments that exist in justification. It makes only a passing mention of the “arguments put forward” by the Act’s defenders, and does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe them. See ante, at 21. I imagine that this is because it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views as they see them.

To choose just one of these defenders’ arguments, DOMA avoids difficult choice-of-law issues that will now arise absent a uniform federal definition of marriage. See, e.g., Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Fed- eral Statutes, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (2012). Imagine a pair of women who marry in Albany and then move to Alabama, which does not “recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex.” Ala. Code §30–1–19(e) (2011). When the couple files their next federal tax return, may it be a joint one? Which State’s law controls, for federal-law purposes: their State of celebration (which recognizes the marriage) or their State of domicile (which does not)? (Does the answer depend on whether they were just visiting in Albany?) Are these questions to be answered as a matter of federal common law, or perhaps by borrowing a State’s choice-of-law rules? If so, which State’s? And what about States where the status of an out-of-state same-sex marriage is an unsettled question under local law? See Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N. Y. 3d 358, 920 N. E. 2d 328 (2009). DOMA avoided all of this uncertainty by speci- fying which marriages would be recognized for federal purposes. That is a classic purpose for a definitional provision.

Further, DOMA preserves the intended effects of prior legislation against then-unforeseen changes in circumstance. When Congress provided (for example) that a special estate-tax exemption would exist for spouses, this exemption reached only opposite-sex spouses—those being the only sort that were recognized in any State at the time of DOMA’s passage. When it became clear that changes in state law might one day alter that balance, DOMA’s definitional section was enacted to ensure that state-level experimentation did not automatically alter the basic operation of federal law, unless and until Congress made the further judgment to do so on its own. That is not animus—just stabilizing prudence. Congress has hardly demonstrated itself unwilling to make such further, revising judgments upon due deliberation. See, e.g., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 124Stat. 3515.

The Court mentions none of this. Instead, it accuses the Congress that enacted this law and the President who signed it of something much worse than, for example, having acted in excess of enumerated federal powers—or even having drawn distinctions that prove to be irrational. Those legal errors may be made in good faith, errors though they are. But the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with malice—with the “purpose” (ante, at 25) “to disparage and to injure” same-sex couples. It says that the motivation for DOMA was to “demean,” ibid.; to “impose inequality,” ante, at 22; to “impose . . . a stigma,” ante, at 21; to deny people “equal dignity,” ibid.; to brand gay people as “unworthy,” ante, at 23; and to “humiliat[e]” their children, ibid. (emphasis added).

I am sure these accusations are quite untrue. To be sure (as the majority points out), the legislation is called the Defense of Marriage Act. But to defend traditional marriage is not to condemn, demean, or humiliate those who would prefer other arrangements, any more than to defend the Constitution of the United States is to condemn, demean, or humiliate other constitutions. To hurl such accusations so casually demeans this institution. In the majority’s judgment, any resistance to its holding is beyond the pale of reasoned disagreement. To question its high-handed invalidation of a presumptively valid statute is to act (the majority is sure) with the purpose to “disparage,” ”injure,” “degrade,” ”demean,” and “humiliate” our fellow human beings, our fellow citizens, who are homosexual. All that, simply for supporting an Act that did no more than codify an aspect of marriage that had been unquestioned in our society for most of its existence—indeed, had been unquestioned in virtually all societies for virtually all of human history. It is one thing for a society to elect change; it is another for a court of law to impose change by adjudging those who oppose it hostes humani generis, enemies of the human race.

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The penultimate sentence of the majority’s opinion is a naked declaration that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined” to those couples “joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State.” Ante, at 26, 25. I have heard such “bald, unreasoned disclaimer[s]” before. Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 604. When the Court declared a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy, we were assured that the case had nothing, nothing at all to do with “whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” Id., at 578. Now we are told that DOMA is invalid because it “demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects,” ante, at 23—with an accompanying citation of Lawrence. It takes real cheek for today’s majority to assure us, as it is going out the door, that a constitutional requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue here—when what has preceded that assurance is a lecture on how superior the majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it. I promise you this: The only thing that will “confine” the Court’s holding is its sense of what it can get away with.

I do not mean to suggest disagreement with The Chief Justice’s view, ante, p. 2–4 (dissenting opinion), that lower federal courts and state courts can distinguish today’s case when the issue before them is state denial of marital status to same-sex couples—or even that this Court could theoretically do so. Lord, an opinion with such scatter-shot rationales as this one (federalism noises among them) can be distinguished in many ways. And deserves to be. State and lower federal courts should take the Court at its word and distinguish away.

In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion. As I have said, the real rationale of today’s opinion, whatever disappearing trail of its legalistic argle-bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated by “ ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ ” couples in same-sex marriages. Supra, at 18. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status. Consider how easy (inevitable) it is to make the following substitutions in a passage from today’s opinion ante, at 22:

“DOMA’s This state law’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages constitutionally protected sexual relationships, see Lawrence, and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA this state law contrives to deprive some couples married under the laws of their State enjoying constitutionally protected sexual relationships, but not other couples, of both rights and responsibilities.”

Or try this passage, from ante, at 22–23:

“[DOMA] This state law tells those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages relationships are unworthy of federal state recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage relationship. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, . . . .”

Or this, from ante, at 23—which does not even require alteration, except as to the invented number:

“And it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.”

Similarly transposable passages—deliberately transposable, I think—abound. In sum, that Court which finds it so horrific that Congress irrationally and hatefully robbed same-sex couples of the “personhood and dignity” which state legislatures conferred upon them, will of a certitude be similarly appalled by state legislatures’ irrational and hateful failure to acknowledge that “personhood and dignity” in the first place. Ante, at 26. As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe.

By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition. Henceforth those challengers will lead with this Court’s declaration that there is “no legitimate purpose” served by such a law, and will claim that the traditional definition has “the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure” the “personhood and dignity” of same-sex couples, see ante, at 25, 26. The majority’s limiting assurance will be meaningless in the face of language like that, as the majority well knows. That is why the language is there. The result will be a judicial distortion of our society’s debate over marriage—a debate that can seem in need of our clumsy “help” only to a member of this institution.

As to that debate: Few public controversies touch an institution so central to the lives of so many, and few inspire such attendant passion by good people on all sides. Few public controversies will ever demonstrate so vividly the beauty of what our Framers gave us, a gift the Court pawns today to buy its stolen moment in the spotlight: a system of government that permits us to rule ourselves. Since DOMA’s passage, citizens on all sides of the question have seen victories and they have seen defeats. There have been plebiscites, legislation, persuasion, and loud voices—in other words, democracy. Victories in one place for some, see North Carolina Const., Amdt. 1 (providing that “[m]arriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this State”) (approved by a popular vote, 61% to 39% on May 8, 2012), 6 are offset by victories in other places for others, see Maryland Question 6 (establishing “that Maryland’s civil marriage laws allow gay and lesbian couples to obtain a civil marriage license”) (approved by a popular vote, 52% to 48%, on November 6, 2012). 7 Even in a single State, the question has come out differently on different occasions. Compare Maine Question 1 (permitting “the State of Maine to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples”) (approved by a popular vote, 53% to 47%, on November 6, 2012) 8 with Maine Question 1 (rejecting “the new law that lets same-sex couples marry”) (approved by a popular vote, 53% to 47%, on November 3, 2009). 9

In the majority’s telling, this story is black-and-white: Hate your neighbor or come along with us. The truth is more complicated. It is hard to admit that one’s political opponents are not monsters, especially in a struggle like this one, and the challenge in the end proves more than today’s Court can handle. Too bad. A reminder that disagreement over something so fundamental as marriage can still be politically legitimate would have been a fit task for what in earlier times was called the judicial temperament. We might have covered ourselves with honor today, by promising all sides of this debate that it was theirs to settle and that we would respect their resolution. We might have let the People decide.

But that the majority will not do. Some will rejoice in today’s decision, and some will despair at it; that is the nature of a controversy that matters so much to so many. But the Court has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat. We owed both of them better. I dissent.

Notes

1 For an even more advanced scavenger hunt, one might search the annals of Anglo-American law for another “Motion to Dismiss” like the one the United States filed in District Court: It argued that the court should agree “with Plaintiff and the United States” and “not dismiss” the complaint. (Emphasis mine.) Then, having gotten exactly what it asked for, the United States promptly appealed.

2 There the Justice Department’s refusal to defend the legislation was in accord with its longstanding (and entirely reasonable) practice of declining to defend legislation that in its view infringes upon Presidential powers. There is no justification for the Justice Department’s abandoning the law in the present case. The majority opinion makes a point of scolding the President for his “failure to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress based on a constitutional theory not yet established in judicial decisions,” ante, at 12. But the rebuke is tongue-in-cheek, for the majority gladly gives the President what he wants. Contrary to all precedent, it decides this case (and even decides it the way the President wishes) despite his abandonment of the defense and the consequent absence of a case or controversy.

3 Justice Alito attempts to limit his argument by claiming that Congress is injured (and can therefore appeal) when its statute is held unconstitutional without Presidential defense, but is not injured when its statute is held unconstitutional despite Presidential defense. I do not understand that line. The injury to Congress is the same whether the President has defended the statute or not. And if the injury is threatened, why should Congress not be able to participate in the suit from the beginning, just as the President can? And if having a statute declared unconstitutional (and therefore inoperative) by a court is an injury, why is it not an injury when a statute is declared unconstitutional by the President and rendered inoperative by his consequent failure to enforce it? Or when the President simply declines to enforce it without opining on its constitutionality? If it is the inoperativeness that constitutes the injury—the “impairment of [the legislative] function,” as Justice Alito puts it, post, at 4—it should make no difference which of the other two branches inflicts it, and whether the Constitution is the pretext. A principled and predictable system of jurisprudence cannot rest upon a shifting concept of injury, designed to support standing when we would like it. If this Court agreed with Justice Alito’s distinction, its opinion in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811 (1997) , which involved an original suit by Members of Congress challenging an assertedly unconstitutional law, would have been written quite differently; and Justice Alito’s distinguishing of that case on grounds quite irrelevant to his theory of standing would have been unnecessary.

4 Such a suggestion would be impossible, given the Federal Government’s long history of making pronouncements regarding marriage—for example, conditioning Utah’s entry into the Union upon its prohibition of polygamy. See Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, §3, 28Stat. 108 (“The constitution [of Utah]” must provide “perfect toleration of religious sentiment,” “Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited”).

5 Since the Equal Protection Clause technically applies only against the States, see U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, Bolling and Moreno, dealing with federal action, relied upon “the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” Moreno, 413 U. S., at 533.

6 North Carolina State Board of Elections, Official Results: Primary Election of May 8, 2012, Constitutional Amendment.

7 Maryland State Board of Elections, Official 2012 Presidential General Election Results for All State Questions, Question 06.

8 Maine Bureau of Elections, Nov. 3, 2009, Referendum Tabulation (Question 1).

9 Maine Bureau of Elections, Nov. 6, 2012, Referendum Election Tabulations (Question 1).

Dissent

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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Bad News For President Asshat: 70% Of Americans Want More Scandal Investigations

Poll: Obama Collapses; 70% Want More Benghazi, IRS Investigations – Big Journalism

A new Fox News poll released Tuesday shows that President Obama’s troubles have only gotten worse since the cable news network’s previous poll. As of now, Obama is upside down by a full eight points with only 43% approving of his job performance while 51% disapprove. Last month, in this same poll, Obama was in a little better shape at 44% – 50%.

This poll almost perfectly aligns Fox News with other recent polls showing a similar slide.

The internals of the poll don’t look much better. Obama’s approval among Democrats is down to 73% (a new Washington Post polls shows the same).

On specific issues, Obama upside on all but one by double-digits:

* Economy: 38 percent approve, 58 percent disapprove (-20).
* Immigration: 39 percent approve, 53 percent disapprove (-14).
* Gun control: 38 percent approve, 57 percent disapprove (-19).
* Deficits: 32 percent approve, 63 percent disapprove (-31).
* Healthcare: 41 percent approve, 55 percent disapprove (-14)
* Foreign policy: 41 percent approve, 50 percent disapprove (-9)

On issues surrounding the handful of scandals swirling around the White House, Obama can only muster 32% approval of his wide-open surveillance programs and his handling of the IRS. Disapproval on both issues is over 70%.

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As to whether or not the GOP congress should continue investigating Benghazi, the IRS, and the Justice Department’s spying on journalists, it isn’t even close. On all three issues, over 70% want the inquiries to continue with less than 28% saying no. This is a huge failure for a mainstream media that has worked overtime to make these investigations a liability for the GOP.

The news breaking today about the GDP being revised way down to 1.8%, a collapse in mortgage applications, and the promise of more NSA revelations, shows there is little relief in sight for our embattled president.

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Obama Regime Meets With Yet Another Jihadist Parasite

Sheikh Who OK’d Killing Americans In Iraq Gets White House Reception – Pajamas Media

Steve Emerson and John Rossomando of the Investigative Project reported last night that Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah, vice president of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), was received by senior Obama administration officials in the White House on June 13:

Bin Bayyah’s website claims that he met June 13 with senior Obama administration officials at the White House.

Nonetheless, it was the Obama administration which sought the meeting with Bin Bayyah, his website’s account said.

“We asked for this meeting to learn from you and we need to be looking for new mechanisms to communicate with you and the Association of Muslim Scholars (another name used for the IUMS),” Gayle Smith, senior director of the National Security Council, reportedly said.

Bin Bayyah’s June 13 account placed other senior officials in the meeting, including: Rashad Hussain, the U.S. special envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and White House spokeswoman Jennifer Palmieri. But the account was later changed to delete the reference to Donilon’s presence at the meeting.

Smith also thanked Bin Bayyah for “his efforts to bring more understanding amongst humanity” during the meeting, the Bin Bayyah account said.

The White House did not respond to repeated requests for comments between June 14 and Tuesday.

Bin Bayyah posted a picture of himself in the White House on his website:

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Obama’s OIC envoy Rashad Hussain and other top Islamic advisers to the president, including ISNA president Mohamed Magid, traveled to Mauritania last year (where slavery is still openly practiced) to confer with bin Bayyah.

What’s even more remarkable about bin Bayyah’s White House reception is that he was one of the clerics endorsing a IUMS fatwa in November 2004 authorizing the killing of Americans in Iraq. Bin Bayyah was vice president of the organization at the time. The IUMS fatwa was even promoted on the official Iraqi resistance website.

More recently, bin Bayyah capitalized on the terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi last September to appeal to Western governments to criminalize defamation of Islam (a call seconded by some U.S. Islamic organizations), as the administration began pushing the bogus “YouTube video” justification for the attack:

We are extremely concerned with a small active minority in your countries that seeks to perpetuate a state of conflict and war.

We estimate that such objectives do not serve the general interest. Therefore, it is our hope that you reconsider and criminalize the denigration of religious symbols, as such provocations do not serve the principles of free speech, principles that you and us both seek to uphold.

It should be noted that this White House visit is not bin Bayyah’s first trip to Washington D.C. In April 2011, bin Bayyah was feted on Capitol Hill by Obama advisers Mohamed Majid and Hamza Yusuf, who were ironically holding a session on “Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism from a Theological Perspective.” The event was sponsored by Obama administration outreach-partner organization Muflehun.

Bin Bayyah was also the keynote speaker at a May 2012 Georgetown University symposium with Mohamed Majid and IUMS board member Jamal Badawi. I have previously noted that Badawi is a foreign cleric who is known to have raised money for terrorist organizations and openly supports terrorist organizations, and yet is still let into the country by the Department of Homeland Security.

Emerson and Rossomando also note that bin Bayyah is deputy of the international Muslim Brotherhood’s senior jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi, aka the “Theologian of Terror,” who is the president of IUMS and was the first Sunni cleric to issue a fatwa endorsing suicide bombings back in 1994. As a result of his terror endorsements, Qaradawi has been banned from the United States since 1999.

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Supreme Court Rules Defense Of Marriage Act Unconstitutional

Supreme Court Rules Defense Of Marriage Act Unconstitutional – The Hill

The Supreme Court on Wednesday struck down the heart of a federal law defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman.

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In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court overturned a section of the Defense of Marriage Act that bars same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits, even if they live in a state that recognizes same-sex marriages.

The challenge to DOMA was filed by Edith Windsor, a New York widow who inherited her late wife’s home but was forced to pay dramatically higher property taxes than she would have if she had married a man, even though the state recognized her marriage.

Kennedy wrote that the law desprived liberties to couples in same-sex marriages that are protected by the Fifth Amendment.

“DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty,” Kennedy wrote. “It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others.”

The court’s liberal wing joined Kennedy in the majority decision, while the court’s conservative justices dissented in three separate opinions.

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Amnesty Bill Incentivizes Employers To Replace Americans With Former Illegal Aliens

Senate Bill Incentivizes Employers To Fire Americans And Hire Amnestied Immigrants – Big Government

Under the Gang of 8’s backroom immigration deal with Senators Schumer, Corker and Hoeven, formerly illegal immigrants who are amnestied will be eligible to work, but will not be eligible for ObamaCare. Employers who would be required to pay as much as a $3,000 penalty for most employees who receive an ObamaCare healthcare “exchange” subsidy, would not have to pay the penalty if they hire amnestied immigrants.

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Consequently, employers would have a significant incentive to hire or retain amnestied immigrants, rather than current citizens, including those who have recently achieved citizenship via the current naturalization process.

The issue is really an “interaction effect” of the immigration proposal and ObamaCare itself.

Beginning in January, businesses with 50 or more full-time employees, that do not currently offer healthcare benefits that are considered “acceptable” by the Obama administration, must pay a penalty if at least one of their workers obtains insurance on a new government-run “exchange.” The penalty can be as much as $3,000 per employee.

Many employers have been preparing to cope with the new regulations by slashing the hours of full-timers to part-time status. Since “full-time,” in the language of ObamaCare, is averaging 30 hours per week, employers will, in general, receive the penalty if they have 50 or more employees who are working an average of 30 hours per week.

If the immigration bill becomes law, many employers could receive incentives of hundreds of thousands of dollars to hire amnestied immigrants over American citizens. In addition, these newly legalized immigrants could work “full-time,” an advantage for companies and businesses as well, while employers could lay off or diminish to “part-time” status, American workers.

Philip Klein of the Washington Examiner explains that he spoke with Alex Conant of Sen. Marco Rubio’s staff in April about the wrinkle, and was told that this was an issue that could be addressed during the legislative process.

“[T]he scenario you raise illustrates both the absurdity of ObamaCare, and why we have insisted on a lengthy process to review this legislation before any votes are taken,” Conant emailed Klein. “We always expected there might be a need for amendments to fix technical problems, and we’ll be interested in seeing what sort of amendments might be offered to improve this part of the legislation without giving ObamaCare to illegals- something Sen. Rubio has always said he will not support.”

However, as Klein said a couple of weeks ago, the issue has not been addressed and, in fact, the Schumer-Corker-Hoeven deal carries out what appears to be a major complication for American workers. Klein said that Conant did not respond to further requests for comment on this issue.

As for Conant’s comment in April about Rubio insisting on a “lengthy process to review this legislation before votes are taken,” that seems to have gone with the wind as well.

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Conservatives To GOP Lawmakers: If You Vote For Amnesty, We’re Done With You

Republican Voters Warn Lawmakers Against Citizenship For Illegal Immigrants – National Journal

The conservative rank-and-file have a loud and clear message for Republican officials: Support citizenship for illegal immigrants at your own peril.

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A sizable plurality of registered GOP voters say they will be less likely to support their incumbent lawmaker if he or she votes for immigration reform that includes a pathway to citizenship for those currently living illegally in the United States, according to the latest United Technologies/National Journal Congressional Connection Poll. The findings show that even as national Republican leaders tout the Senate’s reform measure as a political necessity for the party, it remains a risky vote for individual GOP lawmakers wary of a primary challenger.

Among all adults surveyed, immigration is something of a moot issue: 42 percent of them said a vote either for or against immigration reform would not greatly affect their support for their senator or representative. Thirty-three percent said it would make them less likely to support him or her, and 21 percent said such a vote would make them more likely to back the incumbent.

But among Republicans, the issue elicits much more passion, none of it good for immigration-reform advocates within the GOP. Nearly half, 49 percent, said lawmakers who back a proposal offering a pathway to citizenship will lose their support. Only 15 percent said it would make them more likely to back their incumbent; 30 percent said it would not make a difference in their vote.

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The antipathy runs deepest among the most conservative bloc of voters–blue-collar whites–and in places where many Republicans draw their support, rural areas. Forty-five percent of whites without a college degree said they are less likely to support lawmakers voting for the measure. Just 15 percent said they would be more likely to back them, while 33 percent said it wouldn’t make a difference.

Among rural voters, 45 percent said they’d be less likely to back the incumbent, while 41 percent of them said it wouldn’t make a difference. Just 12 percent said supporting the measure would improve the sitting lawmaker’s chance of drawing their vote.

The conservative base’s continued opposition to a pathway to citizenship–and their promise to seek retribution on elected officials who think differently–highlights a central problem facing Republicans as party leaders try to retrofit the GOP’s message and agenda on this and other issues: In many cases, it’s simply not in a GOP lawmaker’s self-interest to adopt a centrist, moderate position. Adjustments that might be necessary for the party to win back the White House in 2016 often conflict with short-term interests of House or Senate members more worried about their own reelection in 2014.

But GOP lawmakers in upscale, suburban states and districts might find greater forgiveness.

College-educated whites are almost perfectly split on the question: 30 percent said it would make them more likely to support their representative in Congress, 33 percent said the opposite, and 32 percent said it wouldn’t make a difference. Suburban voters were less tolerant, but still more open than their rural counterparts. Thirty-six percent said backing the measure would make them less likely to support their lawmaker, while 37 percent said it wouldn’t affect their vote.

For their part, Democrats are not likely to shower favor upon incumbents who support the bill. Many, 49 percent, said it won’t affect their vote; otherwise, by a 29-19 percent margin, they said support for comprehensive immigration reform makes them more likely to back the incumbent rather than less likely.

Independents side with Republicans on the question, although with less fervency. Thirty-five percent of them said they will be less likely to back a lawmaker who supports comprehensive immigration reform, while only 19 percent said it would make them more likely to support the incumbent. Still, a plurality, 44 percent, said the issue won’t weigh on their decision during next year’s midterms.

The relative lack of interest from Democrats, combined with the GOP-leaning position among independents, creates further disincentive for Republicans, who are unlikely to find much general-election reward for their vote if they survive a primary.

The poll of 1,005 adults, conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International from June 20 to June 23, included both landline and cell-phone respondents. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.6 percentage points.

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Think NSA Spying Is Bad? Here Comes ObamaCare Hub

Think NSA Spying Is Bad? Here Comes ObamaCare Hub – Investors Business Daily

The Health and Human Services Department earlier this year exposed just how vast the government’s data collection efforts will be on millions of Americans as a result of ObamaCare.

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Sen. Max Baucus, D-Mont., asked HHS to provide “a complete list of agencies that will interact with the Federal Data Services Hub.” The Hub is a central feature of ObamaCare, since it will be used by the new insurance exchanges to determine eligibility for benefits, exemptions from the federal mandate, and how much to grant in federal insurance subsidies.

In response, the HHS said the ObamaCare data hub will “interact” with seven other federal agencies: Social Security Administration, the IRS, the Department of Homeland Security, the Veterans Administration, Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Defense and – believe it or not – the Peace Corps. Plus the Hub will plug into state Medicaid databases.

And what sort of data will be “routed through” the Hub? Social Security numbers, income, family size, citizenship and immigration status, incarceration status, and enrollment status in other health plans, according to the HHS.

“The federal government is planning to quietly enact what could be the largest consolidation of personal data in the history of the republic,” noted Stephen Parente, a University of Minnesota finance professor.

Not to worry, says the Obama administration. “The hub will not store consumer information, but will securely transmit data between state and federal systems to verify consumer application information,” it claimed in an online fact sheet .

But a regulatory notice filed by the administration in February tells a different story.

That filing describes a new “system of records” that will store names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, taxpayer status, gender, ethnicity, email addresses, telephone numbers on the millions of people expected to apply for coverage at the ObamaCare exchanges, as well as “tax return information from the IRS, income information from the Social Security Administration, and financial information from other third-party sources.”

They will also store data from businesses buying coverage through an exchange, including a “list of qualified employees and their tax ID numbers,” and keep it all on file for 10 years.

In addition, the filing says the federal government can disclose this information “without the consent of the individual” to a wide range of people, including “agency contractors, consultants, or grantees” who “need to have access to the records” to help run ObamaCare, as well as law enforcement officials to “investigate potential fraud.”

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Obama Climate Lackey: ‘A War On Coal Is Exactly What’s Needed’

WH Climate Adviser: ‘A War On Coal Is Exactly What’s Needed’ –

Daniel P. Schrag, a White House climate adviser and director of the Harvard University Center for the Environment, tells the New York Times “a war on coal is exactly what’s needed.” Later today, President Obama will give a major “climate change” address at Georgetown University.

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“Everybody is waiting for action,” Schrag tells the paper. “The one thing the president really needs to do now is to begin the process of shutting down the conventional coal plants. Politically, the White House is hesitant to say they’re having a war on coal. On the other hand, a war on coal is exactly what’s needed.”

Obama’s speech today is expected to offer “a sweeping plan to address climate change on Tuesday, setting ambitious goals and timetables for a series of executive actions to reduce greenhouse gas pollution and prepare the nation for the ravages of a warming planet,” according to the Times.

Here’s the full context of Schrag’s quotation:

Daniel P. Schrag, a geochemist who is the head of Harvard University’s Center for the Environment and a member of a presidential science panel that has helped advise the White House on climate change, said he hoped the presidential speech would mark a turning point in the national debate on climate change.

“Everybody is waiting for action,” he said. “The one thing the president really needs to do now is to begin the process of shutting down the conventional coal plants. Politically, the White House is hesitant to say they’re having a war on coal. On the other hand, a war on coal is exactly what’s needed.”

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Benghazi Creeps Closer To Hillary Clinton

Benghazi Creeps Closer To Hillary Clinton – Investors Business Daily

Scandal: The decision to place U.S. personnel in Benghazi with substandard security was made at the highest levels of the State Department by officials who have so far escaped blame over the Sept. 11 attack.

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An indication that the Orwellian-named Accountability Review Board (ARB) investigating the terrorist attack on our diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, was an effort not to assign responsibility for the disaster but to enable those responsible to escape blame is the fact that ARB never bothered to interview the likes of Undersecretary of State Patrick Kennedy.

ARB co-chair Thomas Pickering told CBS’ Bob Schieffer on “Face the Nation” in May that he and his colleagues had ample opportunity to question Secretary of State Hillary Clinton herself but concluded that conducting an interview with her was not necessary. “We knew where the responsibility rested,” he said.

In defending the ARB’s findings on Benghazi, Pickering, who co-authored its report with former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Mike Mullen, had no use for whistle-blowers like Gregory Hicks, the No. 2 official in Libya at the time of the strike that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. Hicks had told the House Government Oversight Committee he believed the ARB report “let people off the hook.”

“They’ve tried to point a finger at people more senior than where we found the decisions were made,” Pickering said, citing specifically Clinton and Undersecretary for Management Patrick Kennedy.

His mind was made up, and he didn’t want to be confused with the facts such as the testimony of Mark Thompson, deputy coordinator for operations in the State Department’s counterterrorism bureau. Thompson told the House committee that Secretary Clinton attempted to cut the bureau off from communications about the attack.

“(The ARB) has decided to fix responsibility on the assistant secretary level and below,” testified Eric Nordstrom, who was regional security officer. “And the message to my colleagues is that if you’re above a certain level, no matter what your decision is, no one’s going to question it.” The fix was in.

The disgraceful cover-up afterwards is rivaled by the disgraceful lack of security provided to the mission, which was set up to be a permanent diplomatic post at which Clinton would arrive to celebrate the triumph of the Obama administration’s Middle East policy.

Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012, the day he died in the terrorist attack, because Clinton ordered him there. Hicks said Stephens wanted to have the Benghazi complex upgraded to a permanent constituent post so Clinton could make this announcement in her planned visit to Libya before the end of 2012.

According to a Fox News review of recent congressional testimony and internal State Department memos, Undersecretary Patrick Kennedy, the man not interviewed by ARB, signed off on an internal memo nine months before the attack that green-lighted the Benghazi operation complete with its lack of security.

The December 2011 memo from Jeffrey Feltman, then-assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), referred to Benghazi not as a future diplomatic post but only as a “consulate.” This exempted it from rigid mandatory security standards required for facilities like embassies.

Nordstrom said the Benghazi operation never met the rigid standards set out by the Overseas Security Policy Board, or OSPB, which according to the State Department website is “an interagency body created to assist the secretary” in carrying out security obligations under a 1986 law. Apparently Patrick Kennedy was fine with that.

“I find it very hard to believe that he (Kennedy) would sign this memo without having talked to Secretary Clinton or at least Deputy Secretary (William) Burns,” former ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton told Fox News after examining the December 2011 memo.

Maybe somebody like Pickering and Mullins should have asked them.

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U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 4 Of Voting Rights Act

SCOTUS Strikes Down Section 4 Of Voting Rights Act – Right Scoop

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In short, the Supreme Court struck down the formula used in determining which voting jurisdictions need to ask the DOJ before they can change their voter laws – because of past history of discrimination. The court basically told Congress that the current formula is outdated, given it was established in the 1960s, and gives Congress the opportunity to update it:

ATLANTIC WIRE – The Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder on Tuesday. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion in the 5 to 4 decision. The court found that the VRA’s formula for deciding which jurisdictions should be subject to preclearance is unconstitutional, SCOTUSblog explains, because while the formula was rational in the 1960s, it’s not anymore. In other words, things are different in the South.

The Alabama county challenged Section 5 of the legislation, which requires that states and counties with a history of trying to block minorities from voting get pre-clearance from the Justice Department to change any voting laws – from the requirements to register to vote to the location of a polling station. Section 4 is the formula that determines what places Section 5 applies to. The majority opinion says, “Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in [Section] 2. We issue no holding on [Section] 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”

As Doug Mataconis on twitter pointed out, without section 4 there is no section 5. So basically the DOJ can’t lawfully challenge any state or jurisdiction for changing their voting laws until Congress reestablishes the formula. Let’s hope they don’t.

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Benghazi-gate: Congressman Issa Subpoenas Four State Department Officials

Darrell Issa Subpoenas Four State Department Officials For Benghazi Information – Washington Examiner

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Darrell Issa has issued subpoenas for four current and former State Department officials to find out what they know about the fatal terrorist attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi.

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Issa, in a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, said he has been unable to arrange interviews with the four officials, who Issa said, “possess direct knowledge of the event.”

Chris Stevens, the U.S. ambassador to Libya, was killed in the Sept. 11, 2012 attacks, along with three other Americans.

House and Senate Republicans have been pushing the Obama Administration for additional information on the attacks and the lack of security in Benghazi as well as the decision not to launch a rescue mission during the attacks.

Issa has issued subpoenas for Eric Boswell, the former Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Scott Bultrowicz, the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, Elizabeth Dibble, the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs ad Elizabeth Jones, the acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau Near Eastern Affairs.

It was revealed during a House oversight hearing on the Benghazi attack that Jones had told the Libyan ambassador in the days following the attack that Islamic terrorists were behind it. Jones had sent out that information to nearly all top State Department officials. But just days later, Susan Rice, the United States ambassador to the U.N., said on a round of talk shows that the attack was prompted by an anti-muslim video circulating on YouTube.

Issa said he is issuing the subpoenas because he has not been able to interview the four officials.

“These persistent delays create the appearance that the Department is dragging its feet to slow down the Committee’s investigation,” Issa wrote in the letter to Kerry. “It does not require weeks of preparation to answer questions truthfully. These delays also take us further in time away from the dates of the events in question.”

Issa said congressional investigators nearly two months ago sent a list of 13 State Department officials they want to interview, but have been so far provided access to just one official.

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Twelve Different IRS Units Nationwide Targeted Conservatives

Twelve Different IRS Units Nationwide Targeted Conservatives – Daily Caller

Twelve different groups within the IRS targeted conservative organizations applying for tax-exempt nonprofit status, according to the attorneys representing tea party plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit against the IRS.

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The revelation disproves the suggestion by a top congressional Democrat that only one IRS group was responsible for scrutinizing tea party and conservative applications.

Group 7821, Group 7822, Group 7823, Group 7824, Group 7827, Group 7828, Group 7829, Group 7830, Group 7838, EOG-7887, and EOG-7888, and the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division in Washington, D.C. all targeted conservative groups between 2010 and 2012, according to documentation compiled by the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), which has filed a class-action suit against the IRS.

Rep. Elijah Cummings, the top Democrat on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee investigating the IRS targeting scandal, previously suggested that tea party applications were sent only to Group 7822 for scrutiny. Cummings released transcripts of an interview his staff conducted with John Shafer, an employee of the Cincinnati IRS office, who claimed that he sent tea party applications specifically to Group 7822.

“Based upon everything I’ve seen the case is solved,” Cummings said on CNN during a June 9 interview.

The ACLJ disagrees.

“[John] Shafer was just one individual describing his experience interacting with one group [Group 7822]. If he was only interacting with one group then his involvement in this process was minimal,” ACLJ senior counsel David French told The Daily Caller.

“Group 7822 was pinpointed because of the release from Rep. Cummings, which created the impression that there were one or two agents that referred to a single group,” French said. “In fact we are dealing with multiple IRS offices across the nation that were targeting conservative groups, and eleven different IRS groups beside Group 7822, including the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division in Washington. Each of these groups was working on tea party and conservative cases.”

“After Rep. Cummings’ statement, the media fixated on Group 7822 as the patient zero of the outbreak when the reality is it was many groups, so the IRS hierarchy is much more implicated,” French said.

Between 2010 and 2012, the IRS sent letters to tea party applicants across the country demanding more information before their tax-exempt applications could be approved. On the upper left-hand corner of these letters, the IRS identified the working group within the agency requesting the information. Twelve different groups appeared on these letters, according to French.

The El Monte, California IRS office, for instance, sent a letter requesting additional information to Oklahoma City Patriots in Action, dated February 9, 2012, which listed the IRS group EOG-7887 in the upper left-hand corner.

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“We’re going to find out the differences between these IRS groups in litigation,” French said. “Which personnel were in each group? Was there overlap in personnel?”

It remains unclear whether these IRS groups existed prior to the targeting. It is also unclear whether these groups each had their own physical locations, according to French.

Despite claims by IRS officials that the targeting occurred only in the agency’s Cincinnati office, the ACLJ compiled letters proving that IRS offices in Washington, D.C. and the California cities of El Monte and Laguna Niguel also targeted conservatives. The Daily Caller has also reported that the agency’s Baltimore and Chicago offices engaged in the improper targeting.

Cincinnati-based IRS employee Elizabeth Hofacre told congressional investigators that Washington-based IRS lawyer Carter Hull oversaw her office’s targeting, and even instructed her on how to demand additional information from tea party groups. “I was essentially a front person, because I had no autonomy or no authority to act on [applications] without Carter Hull’s influence or input,” Hofacre said.

“We know that the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division in Washington, D.C. was involved, and that’s where Carter Hull and Lois Lerner were working. We have 14 letters directly from Lois Lerner,” French said. “When Lois Lerner said on May 10 that this was just a few agents in Cincinnati, we were literally holding in our hands 14 letters that she wrote to conservative groups.”

The IRS did not immediately return a request for comment.

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Gang Of Parasites: Amnesty Bill Clears Key Senate Hurdle (Video)

Immigration Bill Easily Clears Key Senate Test; Here Are the 15 Republicans Who Voted Yes – The Blaze

Highly debated immigration legislation cleared a key Senate hurdle with votes to spare on Monday, pointing the way to near-certain passage within days for $38 billion worth of future security measures along the border with Mexico and an unprecedented chance at citizenship for millions living in the country illegally.

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The vote was 67-27, seven more than the 60 needed, with 15 Republicans agreeing to advance legislation at the top of President Barack Obama’s second-term domestic agenda.

Here are the 15 Republican senators who voted in favor of invoking cloture on the amendment, according to the Weekly Standard:

* Lamar Alexander
* Kelly Ayotte
* Jeffrey Chiesa
* Susan Collins
* Bob Corker
* Jeff Flake
* Lindsey Graham
* Orrin Hatch
* Dean Heller
* John Hoeven
* Mark Kirk
* John McCain
* Lisa Murkowski
* Marco Rubio
* Roger Wicker

The vote came as Obama campaigned from the White House for the bill, saying, “now is the time” to overhaul an immigration system that even critics of the legislation agree needs reform.

Last-minute frustration was evident among opponents. In an unusual slap at members of his own party as well as Democrats, Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas said it appeared that lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle “very much want a fig leaf” on border security to justify a vote for immigration.

“We have seen this play before, it is reminiscent of Obamacare,” Cruz said on the Senate floor Monday. “Yet another bill that we were told we’ve got to pass it to find out what’s in it.”

Watch Cruz rail against the bill below:

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Senate passage on Thursday or Friday would send the issue to the House, where conservative Republicans in the majority oppose citizenship for anyone living in the country illegally.

Some GOP lawmakers have appealed to Speaker John Boehner not to permit any immigration legislation to come to a vote for fear that whatever its contents, it would open the door to an unpalatable compromise with the Senate. At the same time, the House Judiciary Committee is in the midst of approving a handful of measures related to immigration, action that ordinarily is a prelude to votes in the full House.

“Now is the time to do it,” Obama said at the White House before meeting with nine business executives who support a change in immigration laws. He added, “I hope that we can get the strongest possible vote out of the Senate so that we can then move to the House and get this done before the summer break” beginning in early August.

He said the measure would be good for the economy, for business and for workers who are “oftentimes exploited at low wages.”

As for the overall economy, he said, “I think every business leader here feels confident that they’ll be in a stronger position to continue to innovate, to continue to invest, to continue to create jobs and ensure that this continues to be the land of opportunity for generations to come.”

Opponents saw it otherwise. “It will encourage more illegal immigration and must be stopped,” Cruz exhorted supporters via email, urging them to contact their own senators with a plea to defeat the measure.

Leaving little to chance, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced it was launching a new seven-figure ad buy Monday in support of the bill. “Call Congress. End de facto amnesty. Create jobs and economic growth by supporting conservative immigration reforms,” the ad said.

Senate officials said some changes were still possible to the bill before it leaves the Senate – alterations that would swell the vote total.

At the same time, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., who voted to advance the measure during the day, said he may yet end up opposing it unless he wins a pair of changes he is seeking.

Senate Democrats were unified on the vote.

Republicans were anything but on a bill that some party leaders say offers the GOP a chance to show a more welcoming face to Hispanic voters, yet tea party-aligned lawmakers assail as amnesty for those who have violated the law.

The party’s two top Senate leaders, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and John Cornyn of Texas, voted against advancing the measure. Both are seeking new terms next year.

Among potential 2016 GOP presidential contenders, Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida was an enthusiastic supporter of the bill, while Cruz and Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky were opposed.

The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office has estimated the legislation will reduce the deficit and increase economic growth in each of the next two decades. It is also predicting unemployment will rise slightly through 2020, and that average wages will move lower over a decade.

At its core, the legislation in the Senate would create a 13-year pathway to citizenship for an estimated 11 million immigrants living illegally in the United States. It also calls for billions of dollars to be spent on manpower and technology to secure the 2,000-mile border with Mexico, including a doubling of the Border Patrol with 20,000 new agents.

Opponents to the bill, including Sen. Cruz, say the bill makes border security promises that may never come to fruition.

The measure also would create a new program for temporary farm laborers to come into the country, and another for lower-skilled workers to emigrate permanently. At the same time, it calls for an expansion of an existing visa program for highly-skilled workers, a gesture to high tech companies that rely heavily on foreigners.

In addition to border security, the measure phases in a mandatory program for employers to verify the legal status of potential workers, and separate effort to track the comings and goings of foreigners at some of the nation’s airports.

The legislation was originally drafted by a bipartisan Gang of 8, four senators from each party who negotiated a series of political trade-offs over several months.

The addition of the tougher border security provisions came after CBO informed lawmakers that they could potentially spend tens of billions of dollars to sweeten the bill without fearing higher deficits.

The result was a series of changes negotiated between the Gang of 8 and Republican Sens. John Hoeven of North Dakota and Bob Corker of Tennessee. Different, lesser-noticed provisions helped other lawmakers swing behind the measure.

In a speech on the Senate floor, Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, likened some of them to “earmarks,” the now-banned practice of directing federal funds to the pet projects of individual lawmakers.

He cited a provision creating a $1.5 billion jobs fund for low-income youth and pair of changes to benefit the seafood processing industry in Alaska. Sen. Bernard Sanders, I-Vt., issued a statement on Friday trumpeting the benefits of the first; Alaska Sens. Lisa Murkowski, a Republican, and Mark Begich, a Democrat, took credit for the two others.

Grassley also raised questions about the origin of a detailed list of planes, sensors, cameras and other equipment to be placed along the southern border.

“Who provided the amendment sponsors with this list?” asked Grassley, who is a member of the Judiciary Committee that approved an earlier version of the bill. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano “did not provide the committee with any list. Did Sikorsky, Cessna and Northrup Grumann send up a wish list to certain members of the Senate?”

Randy Belote, a spokesman for Northrup Grumann, said in an email the firm has “not had the opportunity to review the comments nor… provided the committee a ‘wish list’ of its systems to consider.”

Officials at the other two companies did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

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IRS Has Handed Out Tens Of Millions Of Taxpayer Dollars To Illegal Aliens

IRS Has Been Handing Out Tens Of $Millions Of Our Money To Illegal Aliens – Moonbattery

Like the rest of the federal behemoth, the IRS is only your enemy if you are a normal, self-supporting, law-abiding American. For others it can be a very dear friend:

The Internal Revenue Service sent 23,994 tax refunds worth a combined $46,378,040 to “unauthorized” alien workers who all used the same address in Atlanta, Ga., in 2011, according to the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA).

That was not the only Atlanta address theoretically used by thousands of “unauthorized” alien workers receiving millions in federal tax refunds in 2011. In fact, according to a TIGTA audit report published last year, four of the top ten addresses to which the IRS sent thousands of tax refunds to “unauthorized” aliens were in Atlanta.

The IRS sent 11,284 refunds worth a combined $2,164,976 to unauthorized alien workers at a second Atlanta address; 3,608 worth $2,691,448 to a third; and 2,386 worth $1,232,943 to a fourth.

Atlanta is hardly the only city where this takes place. An address here in Phoenix collected $5,558,608 in free money.

Theoretically, the purpose of the IRS is to collect revenue to finance the small handful of constitutionally allowed functions of the federal government. In practice, it largely serves to redistribute wealth from those who create it to those who have no right to it.

When Democrats claim to cut taxes, they are referring to even larger “refunds” of other people’s money to those who don’t pay taxes – and who often don’t even belong in this country.

The IRS actually issues Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers to illegal aliens to help them use Tax Day to loot Americans.

The IRS has long known it was giving these numbers to illegal aliens, and thus facilitating their ability to work illegally in the United States. For example, the Treasury Inspector General’s Semiannual Report to Congress published on Oct. 29, 1999 – nearly fourteen years ago – specifically drew attention to this problem…

“TIGTA’s audit found that IRS management has not established adequate internal controls to detect and prevent the assignment of an ITIN to individuals submitting questionable applications,” said Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration J. Russell George. “Even more troubling, TIGTA found an environment which discourages employees from detecting fraudulent applications.”

Why would the IRS deliberately facilitate massive fraud, even as national bankruptcy looms on the horizon? Because as the scandals involving the targeting of groups ideologically opposed to the Obama Regime made obvious, it is as hyperpoliticized as the rest of the federal bureaucracy. A prime objective of Washington bureaucrats is to displace Americans with millions upon millions of Third World peasants who will gladly vote for more government dependency. To get the numbers our rulers are after, generous inducements must be offered to those willing to travel from afar to climb aboard the gravy train.

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